The time is long past for development of methods for evaluating macro-engineering projects, and/or systems programs and the adoption of some guidelines in decision-making, even though they may be rudimentary and will require considerable improvement.
Macro (meaning large or extensive), as applied to engineering, can describe size, technical difficulty, time required for design and construction, initial costs in money, size of labor force, time to completion, magnitude of impact, etc.
Macro-engineering (ME) is proposed too often as heroic enterprise and excluded from adequate evaluation, stating that conventional yardsticks and rules of management and budget control, do not apply.
They are for the benefit of all mankind and that the benefits are needed regardless of most costs.
Some ME efforts become so apparent only when viewed after completion. New York City, London, Rome, etc., fall into this class; they "grew" without a prior prepared detailed blue print. Washington, D.C., Brasilia, Brazil, and the proposed new capital of Nigeria, are examples of progressively greater degrees of pre-planning.
"Hot" and "cold" wars involve ME.
Such efforts are characterized as being based almost exclusively on the perceived comparative end-effectiveness of projects. Costs in dollars, environmental impact, etc., are relatively minor, if at all, considerations.
The Erie Canal, Panama Canal, Trans-Alaska Pipeline are examples of "unit" projects. They are discussed in Appendices A-D.
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The National Highway Grid is an ME system. The federal government is considering the support of a coal slurry pipe distribution system.
The comparison in costs and political/social/industrial aspects are quite interesting.
"Micro" decisions can result in "macro" situations. The "micro" decisions or efforts by one or two people may be consciously made because of the perceived and desired "macro" effects. The "Pill", incandescent electric light lamp, and the internal combustion engine are examples. ME endeavors require significant effort or result in sizeable impacts on people, society, the economy, the environment, governments, and lifestyles.
The indentification of impacts is difficult and classification into first-order, second and higher order groups, changes with time, political winds, inter-action of other ME, singular insignificant events, and discoveries that may occur after initiations of the ME.
The National Highway System was initiated so as to enable us to drive farther to obtain work or to play. The existence of the system results in the requirement to drive, and to drive farther, in order to work or play.
"Macro-engineering" can also be categorized by one of the following:
a) It involves government funding, or other involvement, (guarantees, special tax incentives, etc.) because of the magnitudes of capital investment requirements the extent of environmental impact, the time span to completion. The demand for the earth's resources are almost beyond imagination.
In the next 15 years we must mobilize as many raw materials as have been extracted during all of man's history on this planet. Within the next 10-15 years we must design, manufacture, install, and bring into full operation as much power production equipment as has been accumulated up to this point in our history.
-4-A characteristic of technological advancement is a decreasing requirement for labor in production. Sophisticated, scientifically intricate production means increasing attention of scientists.
The unskilled are finding it virtually impossible to obtain work. The commitment of capital to construct and tax support to operate, regulate, monitor, and dismantle strains the national economy. The social fabric, political security, physical and biological structure of our planet and its atmosphere are being affected in major ways.
There is a centralization of decision making by persons whose accountability in time is much shorter than the time to demonstration of failure or success. In many instances they will not be present to witness responsible or accountable for the original decision.
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Motivation
The motivations for initiating ME projects may be classed under personal desire for power, conceit, religion, monetary profit, political stability or advantage, national pride, competition, growth, health, safety, etc. (including "the good of mankind").
The most powerful motives are of a competitive sort:
"We want to come out on top."
We want to be able to credit ourselves with first place; to be second is bad, and to be second-rate is intolerable.
The competitive spirit and the desire to excel are important and an integral part of American life. There has always been an element emotional commitment to ME projects. If a project is seen as a challenge, the view is that it is good to excel, that it is good to test one's mettle against significant challenges.
Leaders and political parties seek to promote their political fortunes. The "ins" champion policies (goals, rules, and methods for achieving them) with an eye towards the next election. The "outs" look for weaknesses, failings, and omissions. They try to devise alternative policies with electoral appeal.
Political concern about ME is not primarily on the scientific and technological measures to implement the program but whether it will be a symbol for international cooperation or superiority or a vehicle for socio-political progress or advantage. [We should be curious about the values interests -the motives and stated reasons -that inspire domestic or international political behavior with respect to ME. To what extent -6-is a project motivated by a desire to enhance American prestige over the world or to have one's name recorded in the annals of history? To propose projects for "security," prestige and pride is "patriotic." To challenge ME purported to be for those ends is "unpatriotic".]
By enlisting private organizations in the performance of public functions, government involves them in politics and blurs the line between "public" and private industry. The private organizations retain advantage of private enterprise while serving the vital needs of the nation and still influencing their own futures. "Nationally" inspired ME may be for a private end.
The situation in which we find ourselves was expressed by T. Keith
Glennan, first NASA Administrator:
"We need to have, and understand, nationally accepted goals or purposes.
"How can we decide how important it is to spend, on an urgent basis, the very large sums of money required to put a man into orbit, etc., unless we have a pretty firm grasp of what the purpose behind the whole space effort really is.
"And yet, who knows the answers to this and many similar Some values are only temporary or will exist only in the future.
Some values exist only at the sacrifice of others.
1)
Technology is becoming more voluminous and more complicated.
2) ME either have completion dates too far into the future to permit adequate assessment or no time table at all.
3) The complexity of much new technology and the time span to stages which permit reasonable evaluation so wide or indefinite that it is extremely difficult to anticipate how it will do its primary job and what its second-order consequences will be.
-8-As our understanding of biological, ecological, economic, and social processes improves, as we observe and realize the immediate and future consequences of ME, we have an obligation, under our planet stewardship responsibilities, to evaluate to the best of our abilities our actions and to include their costs, monetary and otherwise, in our analysis and decision process.
Many of the major public engineering expenditures decisions have been characterized by "muddle through" by "rule of thumb" over the objections of "vested interests" and/or "wild-eyed idealists". Public money has been lavished often on "popular" projects with a very hazy idea of the return to be expected and even the extent and depths of all construction costs and obligations once completed.
Cost-benefit analysis may aid, but the present state-of-the-art cannot be applied to the problem of appraising the quality of a horse and rabbit stew. The rabbit being consequences, that can be measured and evaluated numerically, and the horse "the amalgam of external effects, (social, emotional, and psychological impacts and historical and aesthetic considerations) that be adjudged only roughly and subjectively. The horse is bound to dominate the flavor of the stew, meticulous evaluation of the rabbit cannot justify the ME.
There are inherent hazards in leaving of decisions about ME in the corridors of political power. The current establishment of economic and social priorities by Congress reflects, too much, political pressures by The government must improve its relationship with industry by increased emphasis on competive award of contracts and cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts. It must increase pressure for industry to assume a greater share of risk.
-10-
Conclusion
Improving the process by which ME is conceived, evaluated, approved, developed, financed, managed, and terminated is a challenging task.
With most ME, the attendant cost of hundreds of millions and billions of dollars, and the time scale from conception to realization, one wonders whether anything at all can be done.
The magnitude of the irreversible commitment to major projects which will steer policies and life styles for a few generations, our involvement in the internal affairs of other countries and the relationships between them and us, the hazard to the planet etc., makes it essential that we allocate a considerable portion of our attention and efforts to the task.
We must be concerned not only with efficiency (adherence to budgets and completion dates) but also to value (value related to all other economic and social needs and desires) and the objectives (sub-goals) as related to reaching long-term mission or direction for public policy.
The goals of public policy must be developed, specified, and ratified by the political process as an expression of the people's will.
There must be an awareness of, and comparison with, alternatives to a proposed project. Valid analysis requires fundamental research and experimentation on relationships between means and ends, results and costs. ME has output or cost implications that extend significantly beyond the federal government's one-year operating and budgeting period, more often than not, beyond the tenure of political or personnel and -11-frequently into future generations. In the execution of ME responsibility for costs, and adherence to completion schedule cannot be completely assigned before hand.
Effective evaluation requires review of the standards of measurement, proper relative weighing of the several criteria all along the history of the ME. Not only should a comprehensive technology assessment precede the proposal, technology assessment must be conducted at frequent "milestones" during construction and throughout its use so that modification or termination is instituted at the proper time.
Socially responsible management of ME is virtually impossible. Too many facets of society are affected, some positively, some negatively.
More importantly, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle -the precept that the accurate measurement of an observable quantity necessarily produces uncertainties in one's knowledge of the values of other observables -applies in social behavior.
Evaluation requires the constant presence of awareness that the ME is always, some to a greater degree than others, self-serving.
In our society we encourage competition and achievement by offering personal incentives (money, fame, power, etc.).
The scientist stands to get research funds, the university anticipates grants, the non-profit research organization wants contracts out of which it can pay high salaries, the trade union wants to keep up employment, the business concern wants profits, the trade-journal caters to the complex of readers, the congressman seeks re-election, the -12-promoter (governor, elected official, etc.) wants to bring more wealth to a state or region, and the U.S. President wants immortal fame -beginning within his tenure in office.
But these are "human" characteristics which account for our present state of industrial development, health care, medicine, etc. They cannot be eliminated, nor should we not try to completely stifle them.
We must learn to distinguish between: a) regulations which protect public's financial and other interests and b) regulations which result in a loss of industrial incentive, creative ability, and responsibility.
Overall there is a very definite limit to growth, and within that overall limit, a limit to rate of growth. World demand is not only for energy but also for food, forest products, minerals, fresh water marine protein, skilled labor, and so forth. It is a function of rising expectations, rising affluence, and rising population numbers. The technologies that underlie our economic system evolved in a situation of relative resource abundance. What we face is the task of imposing a rational and conscious of allocation.
There must be public identification as to who: billion.
It is argued that this project was privately financed. However, the federal and state governments on the basis of cost-benefit analysis using the original estimate granted rights-of-way from the Artic to the Pacific Ocean. And considered environmental damage worthwhile.
The General Accounting Office, at the request of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, reviewed the project and recommended that the following should apply to similar future projects.
a First and subsequent cost estimates should be viewed with skepticism. How much of the over-run could have been anticipated? Why was the cost estimate changed from 1 billion to 6.4 billion almost immediately after required government approval was obtained?
